On Climate Change and the Black Press

Great read to ponder on Media, Ethnicity and Climate Change…

CANSEA Advocacy and the Emerging Regional Situation

This article is taken from the archives of the Climate Action Network Southeast Asia (CANSEA), SeaNews Issue No. 8,  Third Quarter, 1994.

Among the files of any CANSEA member, one document is considered a classic: the Statement of Southeast Asian and Papua New Guinea NGOs at the Second Regional Consultation held in Megamendung in 1992, which contains unities on a comprehensive set of climate issues. The position statements related to the Climate Convention have since moved along with developments in the UN negotiations, although revolving around the same themes of global equity and the “polluter pays” principle. In this paper we devote time to expand on the issues raised.  What factors in the regional situation should be considered in developing strategies for action?

1. Sustainable energy development. On a global scale, the principle behind all NGO campaigns on energy concerns is that industrialized countries should be the first to cut down energy use simply because it is their consumption patterns for the past century which have led to disastrous changes in the global climate. This must remain an important premise for all our future energy work. However, there are also lessons on sustainable energy management which can be applied to our development situation. These include cost savings from energy efficiency, and the long-term benefits of small-scale, renewable and environmentally cleaner energy sources.

Among the three countries where CANSEA is based, development directions towards the next century reflect the dream of industrialization: The Philippines Medium Term Development Plan (Philippines 2000), Indonesia’s Repelita (V), Malaysia’s New Development Policy (Vision 2020). From the production end, we need to examine the energy resource mix of these development visions and how dependent these will be on dirty sources like coal and nuclear energy vs. renewable and small scale sources.

From the consumption end, what measures exist for demand-side management, or for increasing efficiency among major users such as transportation and industry? Finally, how much control will we have on the true owners of the industrial sector, given the tendency to attract foreign investments at all cost? This is closely related to trade and financing discussed in 4 and 5.

2. Natural resource management. Most countries of the region share the same environmental characteristics. Concerns are common to nearly all, particularly in relation to climate change. Majority of the populations are economically dependent on fisheries, mangroves, coral reefs, on both upland and lowland agriculture and on tropical forest resources. Many major cities are situated in low-lying coastal areas. Many of these already have severe problems which may be aggravated by sea level rise and changes in seasonal patterns such as delayed and lesser rainfall or intense and more frequent tropical cyclones. The specific strategies CANSEA identified are a) to retain of build-up natural forest cover to 50% of the total national land area b) preventing further conversion and destruction of mangrove forests; and c) investigating further the impacts of climate change on coral reefs and coastal areas. Much of the work will have to be based on specific national situations and policies, but it will also be helpful to examine what can be done at the regional level. For instance, sharing management problems for protection and rehabilitation of forest and coastal resources could help us understand both the role and vulnerability of our major ecological systems in a changing climate cycle. Regional level research could yield more trends and patterns which may otherwise be overlooked. It is also timely to ask: to what extent could the adoption of common environmental standards for the region help protect us from dumping of dirty industries, technology and wastes?

3. Technology development and exchange. This is an important concern because of its role in actualizing many of the “should” and “musts” of addressing climate change issues. In developing criteria on the type of technology to be propagated, we must first be sure of what work needs the most technological support. For instance, although many think that the application of technology in climate problems is for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, our experiences in the past 2 years indicate that what we may immediately need is technology to monitor, understand and respond to impacts such a sea level rise or changing weather patters. We also have to decide what standards of technology we are willing to accept. Will we be happy with any “Hi-tech”-looking relics delivered to us? Technology development (like many other things) occurs in a context of global inequality. Most developing countries are disadvantaged in terms of access to appropriate technologies and in the development of their own technologies. We must therefore continue to promote our 1992 views that technology is not something that is merely transferred, as if intelligence were the monopoly of certain regions, but should be developed in both industrialized and developing countries. This should include the propagation of existing appropriate technologies and of mechanisms to transfer them, the enhancement of skills and the provision of resources to enable developing countries to undertake necessary research and development.

4. Internatonal trade agreements. While everyone’s attention was on the UNCED, negotiators for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were laying down the groundwork for new global economic relations. Unfortunately they were more successful, and the full implications of a new trade liberalization and intellectual property rights regime are only recently being confronted. Although many arguments against the GATT are environmental, it’s relationships to climate issues is less obvious. It’s direct influence on many basic aspects of economic development merit a closer look. Some questions which we could ask include: how will changes in global trade affect production and in turn, energy sources and consumption patterns in the region? How will trade liberalization affect proposed regulatory schemes such as carbon taxes? How will we balance “protectionism” with the enforcement of national environmental standards on foreign activities? What about regional economic arrangments? Aside from already developed nations such as Japan and Australia, the rapid growth of the Asia-Pacific region is being led by the Newly Industrialized coutrirs (NICS): The Republic of Korea, Taiwan and HongKong. Among the socialist economies, the People’s Republic of China’s economic performance for the past decade was particularly impressive. Trends towards regional economic integration are also emerging. The heads of APEC member countries are earnestly securing support from the US because of concerns that NAFTA may close up vital markets in North America. Another arrangement, the East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) is being proposed by Malaysia, which in effect would give a greater role to Japan as a trading partner. ASEAN has initiated moves towards the Asean Tree Trade Area (AFTA) over the next 15 years. These key players and merging economic arrangements will undoubtedly shape the local contest of global trade’s influence.

5.  Financing. Under the “polluter pays” principle of the Climate Convention, NGOs have strongly insisted on criteria and conditions for financial assistance for climate projects. This is why schemes like Joint Implementation (JI) as well as the GEF (Global Environment Facility) are continually being questioned by many groups. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private financing also play an important role in determining the type of projects which are implemented. CANSEA’s member countries area all heavy borrowers, with Indonesia leading at 87.8B, followed by the Philippines with $33.9B and Malaysia with $18.* B (The Bottomline, Asiaweek Sept 28, 1994). Private investments are increasing especially in Malaysia. The pattern of direct foreign investment has been dominated for many decades by investments by colonial powers in their existing and former colonies. The strategies determined by CANSEA are basic enough: for foreign aid, to review MDBs track records in relation to the Climate Convention and to lobby for a redirection of lending portfolios to climate-friendly projects. For private investments, governments will be lobbied to set guidelines for private investments, and the implications of these on climate issues will also be monitored. The trickier question would be: How do we reconcile “climate-friendly with the development goals of our governments?

General Recommendations.  CANSEA members have varied interests and strengths, which for the past three years have allowed them to succeed in the areas of research, institutional development and advocacy in the climate convention negotiations. As a regional network, the more difficult task that remains is establishing our presence and airing our positions within the structures that eventually determine the development directions of the region. Among the factors which should be considered, economic trends are the most important. While addressing development questions we must continue to look for the centers of decision-making which will be most in need of our particular environmental inputs. A political constituency is needed for this, and we know that this can only be developed if we share common concerns with the citizenry. Climate change’s impacts provide a rich basis for unity, not just in terms of which ecosystems are affected, but on the nature of the root problems.

References:

Climate Change and Sea-Level rise ; Implications on Coastal Area Utilization and Management in Southeast Asia. James N. Paw and Chua Thia-Eng. Ocean and Shoreline Management, Elsevier Science Publications, FEngland, 1991.

The State of the Evnironment in Asia and the Pacific. 1990 UN-ESCAP Bangkok 1990.

Towards the Pacific Century: Integration and Disintegration in the Pacific Basin. Dean Forbes In: The Far East and Australasia yearbook. 25th Edition, Europa Publications Ltd. London, 1994.

Current Economic Trends in Asia and The Pacific. Chris Edwards. In: The Far East and Australasia Yearbook. 25th Edition, Europa Publications Ltd. London, 1994

How the Climate Change Debate Has Affected Australian Politics

See introduction here.

With the standard of living prevalent in modern Australia, it is easy to forget that people here have lived by the grace of an obliging climate regime.  Scientific observations and warnings on human-induced climatic change especially in the past 50 years are reconnecting us to just how fundamental climate is to nearly everything we do.

While at first glance politics is far removed from the science of climatic predictions and modelling, it is ultimately the political regimes that will need to organise the widespread responses needed to halt, mitigate and adapt to the impacts that we are beginning to experience even now.

This essay looks into the nature of the debate on climate change and how political leadership and the voting public have fared with the challenges for action unrelentingly posed by climate change.   It suggests underlying debates in reconciling environmentalism as an ideology with economic liberalism.

Systematic Science. In the 1970s and 1980s, meteorologists from different parts of the world started to confer about common observations on warming surface temperatures correlated to greenhouse gas emissions.  In 1988, the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organisation constituted hundreds of scientists into the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was tasked to look into the science, impacts, adaptations and mitigations to climate change.

The IPCC disseminated it’s First Assessment Report in 1990 and went on to produce three more major reports in 1995, 2001, and 2007.   These reports progressively acknowledged the certainty that human-induced global warming is occurring at unprecedented rates, and it’s’ drastic effects will continue to be felt in all regions of the world (IPCC 2007).

The reports provided the basis for parallel negotiations led by the UN for an international agreement on climate change that would bind nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the coming decades.

Systematic Skepticism.  Almost as soon as the UN endorsed the issue as a global concern, the multinational fossil fuel industry mobilised to hinder international decisions towards a carbon-free global economy. They sent observers and lobbyists to major climate meetings and recruited political leaders with stakes in coal, oil and gas to water down commitments in the language of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Godrej 2001, Legget 1999).

They sponsored commentators to question the existence of climate change itself, successfully building a constituency of sceptics to match environmental pressure groups. The climate sceptics gave leverage to political leaders hesitant to upset the lucrative status quo of fossil fuel consumption, primarily in the United States and the OPEC countries, but with significant resonance from Australia’s coal industry (Pearse 2009, p.31, Hamilton 2007).  This debate extended into differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries, and policies on market, financial and regulatory mechanisms that would support measurable and time-bound targets in CO2 reductions.

The Bigger Picture:  Environmental Politics in Australia. The development of the climate debate occurred at a period in Australian politics when environmentalism was evolving from conservation movements in the 1970s and 1980s to politicisation into State parties and later a national Green Party in the 1990s (Stewart 2006, pp. 549-554; Australian Greens 2010).  From the late 1990s to the turn of the century, dissatisfaction with both Labour and the Liberal/National Coalition parties on the Iraq war and treatment of asylum seekers, along with the decline of the Democratic Party as middle ground, continued to set the stage for the middle votes to turn to the Greens (Tilby-Sock 2007, p. 266, Carney 2008, p. 192).

The growing need for a coherent environmental platform to address issues such as water and forest conservation was already challenging both major parties to reconcile the basic resource-use orientation of the economy with concepts of sustainability and inter-generational responsibility.  Both parties share an interest in neo-liberalism and have taken positions on some environmental issues, but have not really been able to consolidate these into consistent policies beyond political expediency (Crowley 2004, p.416).  For example, the Coalition’s success in the 1996 elections was attributed partly to the National Heritage Trust fund it offered to the green vote, but John Howard then proceeded to pander to business interests by lifting the woodchip quota (Crowley 2004, p.414)

The Saga of Saying No to Kyoto.  In 1997, Australia negotiated for entry into the Kyoto Protocol and was accepted, although with a bit of disgrace for asking to be allowed an 8% increase in emissions until 2012.  Australia signed the Protocol in 1998, but the government soon after decided to abandon ratification.  This change of heart happened in tandem with the United States government’s refusal to ratify under pressure from it’s Senate and from strong campaigns from the energy and mineral industries (Hartcher 2009bb, p.69).

The Australian carbon lobby itself was busy and effective, infiltrating different levels of government and instigating delaying debates on climate policy (Hamilton 2007, 96-105, Pearse 2009, pp. 31-45,).  Some Liberal Party ministers were encouraged to publicize their scepticism that both climate change and Kyoto were a hoax (Hartcher 2009bb, p.72).  The ethic of balanced reporting in media outlets was used to give airtime to sceptic scientists and opinion-makers, to create a popular notion the science was under debate when it was not (Godrej 2001, Morton 2010).

When the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005, Australia became embarrassingly isolated as the only other Annex I country besides the US not to ratify.  This position became harder and more awkward justify, especially in the context of Australia’s generous emissions target, positive structures such as the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) and visible impacts of drought and floods.

John Howard became increasingly seen as irrationally loyal to the Bush government (Hartcher 2009bb, p. 75),inadvertently providing a rallying point for environmentalists, the Greens, and the ALP.  In 2007, the Australian Labour Party led by Kevin Rudd won the elections with climate change as a major platform issue (Hatcher 2009, p. 148, Albretchtsen 2008).

Polls and Politicians. One perspective on the role of climate change issues in the 2007 elections is that the Australian community realised the gravity of global warming and elected a leader to represent it’s cause (Lowe 2010, p. 213).

Opinion polls at the time certainly showed a high percentage of respondents who stated that they believe climate change and it’s effect on Australia is a major problem (Newspoll 2007, AC Nielsen 2007).  The Green Party notes more than one million green votes cast in 2007, installing 5 Senators, more than 20 State MPs and 100 Greens in local councils (Australian Greens 2010).    In addition, Climate Action Network Australia cites the growth of 120 community-based climate groups in the country and the participation of at least 100,000 Australians in the last mobilisation for Walks on Warming (CANA 2010).

Without totally disregarding these manifestations of green politicisation, there are those however, who attribute the ALP victory not so much to public concern for global warming as to Kevin Rudd’s astute reading of people’s frustration with the Coalition, and how he successfully articulated political commitment to the cause.  (Duffy 2008, Albretchtsen 2008, Hartcher 2009bb p. 171, Pearse 2009, p. 46.)

Whether it was his crafty political position or an overwhelming public mandate, Kevin Rudd  was committed to concrete action.  His two big challenges in the climate issue were, first, to move Labour’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) into legislation in order to put in place an emissions trading scheme (ETS) and enable the country to meet it’s proposed target of reducing emissions by 5-15% of 1990 levels by 2020 (Jotzo 2009).  The second challenge was to promote unified adoption of the UN Framework Convention’s Copenhagen Accord at the 15^th Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2009 (Flannery 2009).

Copenhagen was a disappointment especially compared to the warm international welcome given to Australia when it finally ratified the Kyoto Protocol at the Bali Climate Meeting in 2007.   At the COP-15, Australia was not able to convince other countries, especially China, to agree to the targets and mechanisms that would lower global CO2 emissions post-2012, when the Protocol expires.  At the home front, the failure of the bill on emissions trading to be passed in the Senate in early 2010 was followed not by a daring call for double dissolution but by a statement that further movement on the ETS would be deferred for 2013.

Public reaction to these two failures were reflected in opinion surveys as a decreasing preference for the Labour Party as the best party to handle the issue of climate change (Newspoll 2010b), and a continuing decline in public approval of Kevin Rudd towards the middle of 2010 (Essential Research 2010b).  Renowned climate scientist Prof. Tim Flannery worded his opinion as Kevin Rudd’s  ‘betrayal’ of his vote (Flannery 2010).  The low polling on Kevin Rudd and the Labour Party eventually drove the ALP to replace Mr. Rudd with Deputy PM Julia Gillard in June 2010.

There is a discrepancy about the significance of climate change at this point:  While the opinion polls in the last 6 months have shown electoral interest in climate change to be dwindling up to currently only 12% of the respondents (Essential Research 2010b), it has to be noticed that the climate change debate has so far been significant enough to displace major party leaderships and require policy responses from current leaders in the elections called for August this year.

Even within the Liberal Party, Malcolm Turnbull was replaced as Coalition leader by Tony Abbott in late 2009 on account of his position of negotiating with the ALP on the ETS (Drape 2009, Coorey 2009).  Tony Abbott swiftly proceeded to defy notions that his conservative opposition to the ETS would place the Coalition on a defensive standing, by attempting to brand the CPRS as a “great big tax” (Ewbank 2010a, Hartcher 2009a).

When Julia Gillard announced her government’s climate policy last July 23, it received instant criticism from the Green party and environmental advocacy groups for being too weak and not reflecting the urgency of the climate problem   (CANA 2010, ABC News 2010, Hamilton 2010, Ewbank 2010b).  Although her call for a community consensus has had some positive feedback (Flannery 2010), further poll results have shown that people are shying away from the CPRS and Labour’s handling of the climate issue (Newspoll 2010a, 2010b), and, there has been a definite upward shift of preference to the Greens from 8% six months ago to 13% in mid-July (Essential Research 2010b).

Climate Change, Leadership and Ideology.  These dynamics in leadership and party platforms are the visible effects of the climate debate on Australian politics.  Underlying this situation seems to be a deeper disturbance to political ideology from an extremely complex environmental issue that is all pervading and impossible to set aside.  As it was in the 80s and 90s major political parties seem to still be patronising environmental issues more for political expediency than as a well-studied and coherent party commitment to an ecologically sustainable future.  Unlike forests or lakes that are fixed in their location however, devastation from global warming will be everywhere, accelerating and after a certain point, irreversible (Steffen 2009).

On both levels, the specific imperatives are to link climate change to economic development in policy and public consciousness, to put a price on carbon, and to act without delay (Ewbank 2010b, Keane 2010, Steffen 2009).  Because environmentalism as an ideology aligns best with reform liberalism and social democracy (Fenna 2006), the Labour party has the best philosophical advantage to work out policy instruments, market mechanisms and correct governance in the context of social justice.

Public opinion and perceptions may vary as other issues take precedence and political parties sell different slogans or positions.  However, the impacts of climate change will continue to speak for themselves, and the consistent work of climate advocates for the last 20 years indicate that it will remain an issue of concern in civil society.

To conclude, the climate debate has affected Australian politics in visible and latent ways. Easily observed and quantified are the transitions in internal leadership and voters’ party preferences based on positions for or against action on climate change especially in the last 5 years.  Related to this are public opinions expressed through surveys, mass action and other advocacy media.  A less overt impact are the pressures on ideology and economic strategy which political parties take upon themselves when they commit to action on climate change.

References

Cities for Climate Protection: Planning Local Action in Alice Springs

Archive document:  Local Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Alice Springs. Alice Springs Town Council, June 2006. (45 pp. excluding Appendices)

This document basically puts together a list of framework actions for the Alice Springs Town Council’s commitment to address climate change and global warming as of 2006. My job was to review previous audits on Corporate and Community Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and to reconcile this with the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Goal set out by the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Programme.

We compiled a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Strategy detailing Corporate Measures, Community Measures, Implementation Plans and Commitments to Reporting and Review.  This involved many consultation meetings with different units of ASTC’s staff, liasing with CCP staff, preparing drafts and a submission to a Council Meeting for adoption. This earned the ASTC the completion of Milestone 3 in the Cities for Climate Protection Australia Campaign.

For more information: amihan_oz@yahoo.com.au

Preparation of Area Ecological Profiles

Prepared with the  Ecological Centre of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. Quezon City, 1991

The manual provides detailed guidelines on the preparation of ecological profiles as a planning tool in at the provincial and regional levels. It includes context, definitions, strategies for gathering and organization of data, presentation of information and financial requirements. As Technical Assistant, I compiled existing information into a draft manual, organized meetings to validate content with consultants, conducted a trial of the manual with field staff of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and helped to edit the final report.  The manual is probably still in use in Regional Offices at the DENR.